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Abstract 
This paper is the first investigation of the interplay between dividends and risk 
taking in banks. I examine the role of dividends as a risk-shifting mechanism that can 
exacerbate moral hazard, controlling for standard determinants of dividends in 
nonfinancial firms. My main findings show that banks that are close to depleting their 
capital pay more dividends to their shareholders, suggesting that dividends are used to 
shift risk from bank owners to the taxpayer. These findings support recent policy 
proposals that include restrictions on dividends as part of a set of early regulatory 
responses to bank distress (Geneva Report, Brunnermeier, 2009).       
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“Although many financial institutions have returned to profitability in recent 
quarters, […] it is important that firms retain these profits in order to rebuild 
capital to support lending after official support measures have been removed”  
 
                  Financial Stability Board. Press Release, 15 September 2009, p1. 
 
1. Introduction 
Banks hit by the financial crisis of 2007-2009 can replenish their capital either by 
retaining earnings or by issuing new capital. Recently, Acharya et al. (2009) have pointed out 
that banks continued to pay large dividends
1
 to their shareholders during the crisis despite 
expecting large credit losses, breaching the principle of priority of debt over equity. This type of 
behaviour can lead to default, and should therefore be avoided by banks.  
Under certain circumstances, however, banks are encouraged to increase bankruptcy risk. 
This type of moral hazard behaviour can be caused by regulation that insulates bank owners 
from bankruptcy risk (implicit bailout guarantees). Fixed-rate deposit insurance schemes can 
also generate moral hazard on the part of bank owners. Because the value of the government 
guarantee is positively related to risk, maximization of the value of the deposit insurance may 
lead to socially undesirable levels of risk-taking (Merton, 1977). Capital adequacy regulation 
(1988 Basel Accord and subsequent refinements) should reduce moral hazard deriving from 
deposit insurance regulation, but can be circumvented by practices of capital management and 
by using hybrid instruments. Moreover, capital requirements increase the cost of bank equity 
and decrease franchise value, incentivising risk-taking.  
Dividends may exacerbate moral hazard because of three reasons. First, they reduce the 
market value of assets, increasing the likelihood that it will drop below the face value of 
outstanding debt. Therefore, dividends increase the value of deposit insurance. Second, they 
transfer wealth from the bank to its owners, reducing the negative impact of a default on the 
personal wealth of bank owners. Third, banks tend to deplete their safer assets to pay dividends, 
leaving on their balance sheet the riskier assets. Therefore, dividends are a risk-shifting 
mechanism that impinges on the capital structure of the firm, leading to a thinner equity buffer 
and riskier assets on the balance sheet (Acharya et al., 2009).  
Risk-shifting should be reduced by capital adequacy regulation, because capital 
requirements force banks to internalise a large portion of the potential negative externalities of a 
                                                 
1 To expedite discussion, I use the term ‘dividends’ to refer to cash dividends throughout the paper. 
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default. Banks whose asset quality is poor should, other things being equal, have higher capital 
ratios than banks with better asset quality. In such circumstances, capital requirements would 
imply a trade-off between investment growth (in particular loans growth) and dividends: given a 
targeted investment growth rate, the lower the capital ratio, the higher is the opportunity cost of 
distributing dividends, because dividends reduce the ability of a bank to increase its capital ratio 
to a level compatible with the objectives of its investment policy. In other words, dividends are 
an opportunity cost as they may lead to rejection of profitable projects. Therefore, while banks 
with higher default risk may attempt to shift this risk to debt holders and taxpayers by paying 
dividends, capital requirements should impose costs on banks that pay dividends in the form of 
a reduction in growth potential. To the extent that capital requirements are effective in capturing 
the overall riskiness of the investment portfolio of a bank, the benefits of risk-shifting through 
dividends should be offset by the opportunity costs generated by capital requirements.    
Despite the importance of dividends, the literature on the dividend policy of banks is 
rather sparse, and it is concerned with U.S. banks only. Concentrating on both American and 
European banks is worthwhile because, unlike in the U.S., in Europe there are no Prompt 
Corrective Action (PCA) procedures that can constrain banks’ discretion in their financing 
decisions prior to and during a bank distress. PCA procedures help reduce the risk of a bank 
failure or of a bailout from the government (ESFRC, 2006). Recently, it has been suggested that 
restrictions on dividends should be included in a set of ‘ladder of sanctions’ for banks that do 
not satisfy certain regulatory requirements in terms of solvency and liquidity (Brunnermeier et 
al., 2009). Such measures are likely to be included in the ‘Basel III’ framework, as highlighted 
by a recent speech by the General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, Mr Jaime 
Caruana, who suggests that constraints be imposed on earnings distributions (including 
dividends, share buybacks and bonuses) ‘[…] the closer a bank’s capital level gets to the 
minimum requirement’ (Caruana, 2010, p. 3). 
In this paper, I fill the current gap in the literature by investigating the relationship 
between several risk measures and dividends in a sample of 440 U.S. and 306 European banks 
(from the 27 EU countries) for the period 2000-2008. 
I investigate the impact of default risk on dividends, by using the natural logarithm of the 
Z-score (Boyd and Graham, 1988), which is negatively related to the risk that a bank will 
deplete completely its equity capital. I use the natural logarithm of of the Z-score because the Z-
score is highly skewed, while the log of the Z-score is normal (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
According to a ‘risk-shifting’ hypothesis, banks with a low Z-score (i.e., high default risk) are 
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incentivised to increase dividends, because dividends help transfer this risk to the taxpayer. 
However, Keeley (1990) argues that deposit insurance regulation may reduce risk-taking if it 
results in higher charter value for insured banks.  Deposit insurance, similar to any type of 
government guarantee, would ensure lower refinancing costs to protected banks, leading to 
higher charter values (Gropp et al., 2010). Because charter value is lost in the case of a default, 
implicit or explicit government guarantees may lead to lower risk taking.  
To summarise, while a ‘risk-shifting’ hypothesis is consistent with a negative relationship 
between default risk and dividends (or a positive relationship between default risk and 
dividends), the opportunity costs deriving from losing the charter value in the case of a default 
imply a negative relationship between default risk and dividends.  
To investigate further the relationship between risk and dividends, I consider the impact 
of the variables that are used to calculate the Z-score separately: the capital ratio, calculated as 
equity to total assets, returns volatility, and profitability. The latter variable should of course 
have a positive effect on dividends. However, the relationship between dividends and the other 
two variables deserves investigation. A corollary of my risk-shifting hypothesis is that capital 
ratio should be negatively related to dividends, while returns volatility should be positively 
related to dividends.  
My findings show that dividend payout ratios are positively related to default risk 
(negatively related to the Z-score). Capital ratio has a negative effect on dividends, and some 
evidence is found of a positive relationship between dividends and ROA volatility. These results 
are consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis. 
My findings have important policy implications, especially in light of the current debate 
on the need for banks to avoid paying large dividends. They suggest that restrictions on 
dividends may be needed to prevent bank owners from transferring the negative consequences 
of default risk to the taxpayer, and therefore support the recent proposals for the Basel III 
framework.  
A further contribution of the paper is methodological. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper that allows for endogeneity of risk proxies in regressions where dividend payout ratios are 
the dependent variable. To do so, I employ dynamic panel data models that allow for an 
autoregressive component in dividend payout ratios. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data set. Section 4 reports the main 
results. Section 5 investigates the role of retained earnings and expectation of government 
support during financial distress in the dividend policy of a bank. Section 6 summarises and 
concludes. 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
This paper relates to two strands of literature. The first strand investigates the 
determinants of the dividend policy of nonfinancial firms. The second strand relates to the 
relationship between regulation and the attitude towards risk in banking, and the possibility that 
certain types of regulation produce moral hazard.
2
  
The literature on the dividend policy of nonfinancial firms argues that, other things being 
equal, risk should reduce dividend payments (Rozeff, 1982; Bar-Yosef and Huffman, 1986). 
This begs the question of whether risk and dividends are negatively related in banking and calls 
for an investigation of the influence of regulation on the relationship between dividends and risk.  
Deposit insurance regulation may increase the likelihood of moral hazard in the form of 
excessive risk taking because it discourages monitoring from depositors.
3
 Moreover, deposit 
insurance can be thought of as a put option on the bank’s asset (Merton, 1977) whose value is 
positively related to business risk and leverage. Under a fixed-rate system, banks may exploit 
the deposit insurance scheme by increasing leverage and risk (Keeley, 1990).
4
 In the event of 
default, banks can exploit the deposit insurance scheme to obtain wealth from the insuring 
agency. Accordingly, the value of deposit insurance is positively related to default risk. 
Dividends play an important role in this model, as they decrease the value of assets, which 
implies a decrease in the value of both equity and debt, but benefit only the owners of the bank 
(equity is ‘dividend protected’, Ronn and Verma, 1986)5. Moreover, banks tend to sell their 
safer assets to distribute dividends. Therefore, dividends can be a risk-shifting device for bank 
                                                 
2 Recent literature has investigated whether regulation in the financial sector (in particular deposit insurance and 
capital adequacy regulation) impinges on the determinants of the financing decisions of banks (Gropp and Heider, 
2010). This paper assumes a similar perspective in that it investigates the dynamics of the relationship between 
dividends and risk in the presence of bank regulation. 
3 For countries without a deposit insurance scheme there may be an implicit guarantee of bailout in the event of a 
financial crisis (Hellmann et al., 2000). 
4 Schemes with a more sophisticated fee structure can help reduce moral hazard (Chan et al., 1992; and Gianmarino 
et al., 1993). 
5
 For a more detailed discussion of the role of dividends in the pricing of deposit insurance, please refer to 
the appendix. 
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owners, because they reduce the equity buffer of a bank leaving the riskier assets on the balance 
sheet (Acharya et al., 2009). 
Capital requirements should counteract this type of moral hazard because they force 
banks to internalise the adverse consequences of excessive risk taking. However, capital 
requirements reduce franchise values (that is, the present value of expected future profits of the 
bank as a going concern) because they bring about a higher cost of capital (Hellmann et al., 
2000). When franchise values are high, banks have an incentive not to risk bankruptcy, because 
bankruptcy would prevent bank owners from selling the franchise value (that is, the franchise 
value would be lost). When franchise values are low, however, banks have little to lose, and the 
incentive to gamble and exploit the deposit insurance scheme may be high. Therefore, banks 
should exploit the deposit insurance scheme only if the expected reduction in franchise value is 
lower than the increase in the value of the deposit insurance put option (Keeley, 1990).
6
 The 
negative impact of capital requirements on franchise values may offset the ability of capital 
requirements to reduce risk taking, especially in competitive environments where franchise 
values are low (Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, 2000). Moreover, minimum capital requirements 
could be circumvented by practices of capital management (Collins et al., 1995) and the use of 
hybrid instruments (Acharya et al., 2009).
7
 An additional issue with capital adequacy regulation 
is pro-cyclicality in loan loss provisioning: capital requirements become stricter during periods 
of economic contraction, and exacerbate recessions (Borio et al., 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 
2003; Beatty and Liao, 2009).   
Despite the importance of dividend policy for bank risk, this topic has been overlooked 
by the literature. Bessler and Nohel (1996, 2000) and Cornett et al. (2008) focus on the 
signalling content of dividends. Casey and Dickens (2000) and Casey et al. (2002) investigate 
the determinants of the dividend payout ratio and dividend yield, respectively. Boldin and 
Leggett (1995) investigate the relation between dividends and bank rating. These studies focus 
on US banks only and provide mixed results as to how dividends relate to bank risk. 
                                                 
6 For instance, the Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis occurred in the 1980s has been ascribed to competition (driven by 
deposit rate deregulation), which caused a decline in the franchise value of the S&L. In such circumstances, banks 
were incentivised to increase the put option implied by the deposit insurance scheme (Keeley, 1990).  
7 Hybrid instruments are included in tier 2 of the regulatory capital required by the 1988 Basel Accord. Because they 
do not constitute equity in the sense of a residual claim of the shareholders, they imply higher risk for debt holders 
and incentivise leveraging and excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. This phenomenon takes place 
because common equity represents a call option on the ownership of a bank, whose exercise price is represented by 
the value of debt capital (Merton, 1974): if the value of the assets is lower than that of the liabilities, the value of the 
option (or common equity) is zero. Increasing the fraction of assets funded by capital other than common equity 
increases the exercise price up to a point where the value of the option is close to zero. Owners of highly-leveraged 
banks have nothing to lose, and engage in excessive risk taking. 
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In this paper, I investigate the relationship between risk and dividends in banks, and in 
particular I examine the possibility that dividends exacerbate moral hazard by allowing risk-
shifting from bank owners to debt holders and the taxpayer. The banking literature commonly 
employs the Z-score as a measure of default risk (Boyd and Graham, 1988). The Z-score is a 
ratio whose numerator is the sum of a profitability measure (such as the Return on Assets)
8
 and 
equity to total assets, while the denominator is the standard deviation of the profitability 
measure (see table 1). Given the importance of equity for banks, the Z-score is a more reliable 
measure for risk than the standard deviation of accounting returns alone. Recent literature 
employs the natural logarithm of the Z-score because the Z-score is highly skewed, while the 
log of the Z-score is normal (Laeven and Levine, 2009).   
As an alternative measure of bank risk, the extant literature has widely employed the ratio 
loan loss provisions to total loans (Altunbas et al., 2009; Altunbas et al., 2007; Iannotta et al., 
2007; Nier and Baumann, 2006). However, this measure reflects only a specific type of risk 
(credit risk) and suffers from two drawbacks. First, loss provisioning tends to be backward 
looking, because most banks do not recognise future loan losses timely (Beatty and Liao, 2009). 
Therefore, loan loss provision ratio can at best be a measure of ex-post credit risk. Second, loan 
loss provisioning tends to be procyclical (Borio et al., 2001; Beatty and Liao, 2009), and banks 
postpone provisioning for loan losses until the beginning of economic downturns (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003).
9
 Moreover, banks may manipulate the loan loss provision for purposes of 
income-smoothing, although the empirical evidence is mixed (Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 
1999). Therefore, the ability of the loan loss provision to proxy for credit risk may be impaired 
by practices of earnings management.  For these reasons, I do not employ this ratio as a proxy 
for risk, and I allow for possible earnings manipulation by adjusting profits for changes in loan 
loss provisions.  
On the grounds of the impact of deposit insurance regulation on the pricing of a bank’s 
assets, the main hypothesis tested in this paper is as follows: 
H1: Risk-shifting hypothesis 
According to the risk-shifting hypothesis (henceforth, H1) banks with a high default risk 
are incentivised to increase dividends. Deposit insurance regulation incentivises excessive risk-
taking, and dividends help transfer this risk to the taxpayer. Dividends reduce the overall value 
                                                 
8 Researchers have also used market returns rather than accounting returns (De Nicoló, 2000). 
9 It may be argued that loan loss provisioning should be forward looking, and therefore its use as a proxy for ex-post 
risk is inadequate. However, most banks do not recognise future loan losses timely, and therefore the loan loss 
provisioning is backward looking (Beatty and Liao, 2009).  
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of the assets debt holders can claim in the case of liquidation, and therefore reduce the value of 
debt. Because equity holders are the recipient of dividends, dividends do not affect the value of 
equity (equity is ‘dividend protected’, Ronn and Verma, 1986). Therefore, dividends effectively 
shift bankruptcy risk from bank owners to debt holders and, via the deposit insurance scheme, to 
the taxpayer.
10
 I test H1 by assessing the influence of the log of the Z-score
11
 on the dividend 
payout ratio. According to H1, there should be a negative relationship between the log of the Z-
score and the dividend payout ratio.   
A corollary of my risk-shifting hypothesis is that capital ratio should be negatively related 
to dividends, while returns volatility should be positively related to dividends.  
According to Keeley (1990) deposit insurance regulation may lead to lower risk-taking 
because it may increase the charter value of insured banks, which would be lost in the case of a 
default. Any type of government guarantee would ensure lower refinancing costs to protected 
banks, leading to higher charter values (Gropp et al., 2010). These considerations lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
  H2: Charter value hypothesis  
Default risk is negatively related to dividends. The positive effect of government 
guarantees on charter values deters banks from excessive risk taking, because a default 
would result in the loss of the charter value. Because dividends, ceteris paribus, decrease 
the Z-score, high default risk should act as a deterrent for large dividend payments. In 
other words, dividends are an opportunity cost for banks with low Z-score: while they 
transfer wealth from the bank to the shareholders, they also increase the probability that 
the shareholders lose the bank’s charter value. I name H2 the ‘charter value’ hypothesis. 
To reduce bank risk-taking, bank regulators have introduced capital requirements. Capital 
adequacy regulation impinges on bank charter values, and consequently on bank risk taking 
(Hellmann et al., 2000). Capital adequacy regulation may reduce charter values up to a point for 
which banks are not worried about losing it, and take excessive risk. Therefore, capital 
requirements could lead to a positive relationship between dividends and default risk (H1).    
                                                 
10 As explained in the introduction, capital adequacy regulation may not be enough to prevent moral hazard (Acharya 
et al., 2009; Hellmann et al., 2000).     
11 The literature on dividend policy of nonfinancial firms employs measures of risk such as the beta (Rozeff, 1982), or 
the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of daily stock returns on returns of the market portfolio (Hoberg 
and Prabhala, 2009; Li and Zhao, 2008). Other measures of risk are the standard deviation of stock returns or the 
residuals of a regression of excess returns on the three Fama and French (1992) factors.   
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However, because capital requirements force bank owners to bear a large part of the 
negative consequences of a default, they should reduce moral hazard deriving from deposit 
insurance regulation. Under capital adequacy regulation, banks with a low capital ratio may not 
be able to achieve the risk-return objectives of their investment policy, and large dividend 
payments may be discouraged.  
H3: Opportunity cost hypothesis 
Capital ratio is positively related to dividends. Capital adequacy regulation may reduce 
the incentives to pay dividends deriving from deposit insurance regulation and other types 
of government guarantees. Ceteris paribus, dividends constrain the ability of a bank to 
increase common equity capital, potentially leading to rejection of profitable projects. 
Therefore, in the presence of capital adequacy regulation, dividends are an opportunity 
costs for banks with low capital ratios. I name H3 the ‘opportunity cost’ hypothesis. 
3. Methodology and data 
 3.1 Methodology  
 I investigate the nexus between dividends and risk using the several econometric models: 
OLS model, panel data models with fixed effects, and dynamic panel data models. Previous 
literature on the determinants of payout ratios uses dividends/earnings as a dependent variable 
(Rozeff, 1982). However, this ratio becomes infinite when earnings are zero, and for negative 
large dividends cause the payout ratio to fall instead of increase. This inverse relation between 
dividends and the payout ratio is counterintuitive. Using equity rather than earnings in the 
denominator avoids these two problems. I prefer equity to other possible variables such as total 
assets given the importance of equity capital in banking.
12
  
The specification of the model is as follows:  
Yit = α + ρYit-1 + 'xit + it      (2) 
it = ηi + νit 
E[ηi] = E[νit] = E[ηi, νit] 
ηi ~ N(0,
2
 ), and νit ~ N(0,
2
)  
where i indexes observational units and t indexes time. Yit is the ratio dividends to equity 
(DPE).  and γ are vectors of coefficients, xit is a vector of covariates, including variables 
                                                 
12
 In recent literature for nonfinancial firms, dividends have been scaled by revenues (Khan, 2006). 
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proxying for risk (log of the Z-score, equity to total assets, standard deviation of ROA) and 
controls. The error term it consists of an unobserved panel-level effect ηi (fixed for each bank i), 
and the idiosyncratic component vit (i.i.d. over all observations). 
Due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable Yit-1 among the regressors, a 
dynamic panel-data specification should be preferred to the other specifications. The reasons are 
as follows. OLS should lead to inconsistent and biased estimates in panel data because of lack 
of independence between the covariates and the panel-level effect, E(zit, ηi) ≠ 0, where              
zit = (Yit-1, xit). The fixed-effect panel data model (FEM) provides consistent estimates for cases 
where the covariates are correlated with the panel-level effects, E(xit, ηi) ≠ 0, because it 
eliminates  ηi by subtracting the time mean of (2) from (2) itself. However, this technique results 
in E(Yit-1,
*
itv ) ≠ 0, where 
*
itv  = νit – νi  (Nickell, 1981). In other words, FEM is consistent (but 
less efficient than the alternative Generalised-Least-Squares estimator, which assumes E(xit, ηi) 
= 0), in cases where: 
Yit = α + 'xit + γ'cit + uit       (3) 
uit ~ N(0,
2
) 
If the generation process for Yit is (2) instead of (3), regressing Yit on xit and cit will result 
in an autoregressive error term, uit = ρuit-1 + νit. 
The GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and refined by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), eliminates ηi via differencing (similar to FEM), 
and allows for E(Yit-1,
*vi ) ≠ 0 using the lags of Yit as instruments. While Arellano and Bond 
(1991) estimator (GMM-DIF) employs only lagged levels of Yit as instruments in the first-
differenced equation, Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator (GMM-SYS), based upon Arellano 
and Bover (1995), involves a system of first-differenced and level equations, where lags of 
levels (in the former) and lags of the first-differences (in the latter) are employed as instruments. 
When ρ is large, GMM-DIF tends to perform poorly, because the lagged levels of Yit are weak 
instruments.  In a recent contribution, Andres et al. (2009), show that GMM-SYS performs 
better than GMM-DIF when applied to Fama and Babiak (1968) extension of Lintner’s (1956) 
partial adjustment model. Similar to Khan (2006) and Andres et al. (2009), I prefer the GMM-
SYS to GMM-DIF for my analysis. 
 Section 3.2 defines the variables that constitute xit. Section 3.3 describes the data. 
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 3.2 Definition of the explanatory variables  
Table 1 defines the explanatory variables used in my econometric models. 
My proxies for risk are the log of the Z-score, the capital ratio (equity/total assets) and the 
standard deviation of ROA (SDROA, ROA volatility). To avoid multicollinearity, the equations 
with the log of the Z-score as proxy for bank risk are run separately from those with the capital 
ratio and ROA volatility.  
The extant literature finds that agency costs, loans growth, size, and profitability influence 
the dividend payout ratio. Accordingly, I include several control variables in equation (2) to 
account for the impact of these factors.  
Insiders-Outsiders (IO) conflict. In the U.S., the agency problem mainly refers to the 
conflicting interests of managers and shareholders. In Western Europe, where many 
corporations and banks are not publicly held, insider shareholders are so close to the 
management that the crucial agency problem is between insiders (managers and large 
shareholders) and outsiders (Faccio et al., 2001). Where share ownership is widely dispersed, 
there is a free-rider problem that discourages outsiders’ monitoring of insiders (Grossman and 
Hart, 1980). The conflict between insiders and outsiders may be reduced by paying dividends 
(Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). This ‘monitoring rationale’ is one of the reasons why 
dividends are paid.
13
 I use three proxies for the degree of agency costs. The number of recorded 
shareholders, and the listing on a stock exchange should be positively related to shareholders 
dispersion, and should therefore be positively correlated with the level of agency costs. 
However, quotation on a stock exchange may act as a monitoring device for shareholders 
(Easterbrook, 1984). Thus, the expected coefficient on a dummy variable (1 if a bank is listed 
and 0 otherwise) may be positive or negative (or insignificant). In addition to the two foregoing 
proxies, I employ BankScope ‘independence indicator’ as a proxy for insiders’ influence. I 
construct three dummies, IND1, IND2, and IND3, to proxy for the importance of the main 
shareholder. IND1 is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if there is no shareholder with 
more than 25% of voting rights, and 0 otherwise. IND2 is an indicator variable taking the value 
                                                 
13 Dividends help outsiders monitor insiders because they lead to more frequent equity issues which imply market 
scrutiny (Easterbrook, 1984) and discourage the use of financial resources for empire building and perquisites 
(Jensen, 1986). However, dividends are not the only monitoring mechanisms available to outsiders. If other 
mechanisms exist, dividends may lose their monitoring function (Noronha et al., 1996). This may occur when there is 
a large outsider shareholder whose incentive to monitor insiders is high (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), or when the 
interests of insiders and outsiders are aligned (for example, in the presence of performance-related compensation 
packages for managers). For nonfinancial firms, loan intensity from relationship banks increases monitoring and 
decreases payout ratios (Allen et al., 2009). In banking, regulation may provide an alternative monitoring device for 
outsiders (Filbeck and Mullineaux, 1999). 
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1 if there is a shareholder with more than 25% of total ownership, but no shareholder with more 
than 50% of total ownership, and 0 otherwise. IND3 is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if 
there is a shareholder with more than 50% of total ownership, and 0 otherwise. To avoid perfect 
collinearity, I insert only IND1 and IND3 in my regressions. IND1 (IND3) indicates the highest 
(lowest) degree of ownership dispersion. Dividends should be positively related to the severity 
of the IO conflict. Therefore, if dividends are positively related to agency costs the coefficients 
on IND1 should be positive, while that on IND3 should be negative. Because these variables are 
listing, the number of recorded shareholders and the independence indicator are included one at 
a time in my multivariate analysis.  
Loans growth. Studies on nonfinancial firms find that growth constrains the ability of a 
firm to distribute dividends (Fama and French, 2001; Rozeff, 1982). Literature on banks uses 
loans growth as a proxy for growth (Casey and Dickens, 2000). I expect a negative coefficient 
on loans growth because banks that are growing rapidly are likely to retain more cash than 
banks that lack growth opportunities.  
Size (log of assets). According to studies on nonfinancial firms, small firms are less likely 
to distribute dividends than large banks (Denis and Osobov, 2008; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama 
and French, 2001). As a proxy for size, DeAngelo et al. (2004), and Fama and French (2001) 
use the percentage of NYSE firms with the same or lower market capitalization. Denis and 
Osobov (2008) employ the book value of assets. I employ the log of assets as a proxy for size, 
similar to other studies in the banking literature (e.g. Gropp and Heider, 2010).  
Profitability. According to studies on nonfinancial firms, profitability is positively related 
to dividends (Denis and Osobov, 2008; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2001). As a 
proxy for profitability I employ the Return on Assets (ROA), net of loan loss provisions, and I 
expect a positive coefficient on ROA. It has been suggested that some banks manipulate the 
loan loss provision for purposes of income-smoothing, although the empirical evidence is mixed 
(Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999). The ability of the loan loss provision to proxy for 
credit risk may be impaired by practices of earnings management. A large variability in bank 
profitability can be reduced by inflating the loan loss provision when earnings are high, and 
reducing the loan loss provision when earnings are low. To allow for earnings management, I 
calculate ROA as the sum of net income and loan loss provisions, divided by total assets. To 
avoid multicollinearity, ROA is excluded from regressions where the Z-score is also present.  
Earned equity. DeAngelo et al. (2006) find that the proportion of equity that consists of 
retained earnings (or earned equity) explains dividend payments, supporting the life-cycle 
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theory of dividends. When most of the equity capital is earned rather than contributed dividend 
payments are more likely. The ratio retained earnings to equity (RETE) is found to increase the 
likelihood that a dividend is paid in U.S. nonfinancial firms. However, von Eije and Megginson 
(2006) do not find a significant relationship between RETE and dividends in Europe. In banking, 
retained earnings may be more important than in nonfinancial firms to accumulate enough 
equity capital. Banks may be willing to forego the benefits on dividends (for example, 
signalling) because of the importance of a solid capital buffer for their reputation, and to stave 
off regulatory interventions. In accordance with the findings for non-financial firms, I expect a 
positive coefficient on RETE. 
Initial Public Offerings. Recent studies in the corporate finance literature find that 
dividend policy may be affected by recent flotation on the stock market (Cornett et al., 2008). 
Banks that have just gone public are more likely to initiate dividends than post-IPO nonfinancial 
firms (Cornett et al., 2008). Therefore, I expect a positive coefficient on a dummy equal to 1 if a 
bank went public during the sample period. 
Country and year effects. Given the multi-country nature of my study, I also control for 
possible country effects. According to the outcome model of agency theory (La Porta et al., 
2000), the legal framework under which the bank operates influences dividend policy. Banks in 
countries where there is a strong protection for minority shareholders (typically, countries 
whose legal system is based on common law) should pay larger dividends. Minority 
shareholders whose rights are inadequately protected may lack the necessary legal power to 
induce insiders to pay dividends.
 14
 I use a dummy variable, 1 if the bank headquarters are 
located in the U.S. and 0 if they are in Europe. If in the U.S. the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights is stronger than in Europe, the outcome model predicts that the coefficients 
on the dummy should be positive.
 
Year dummies are included to allow for changes in dividends 
due to changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. 
A more detailed explanation of the covariates that comprise the vectors xit and cit is 
provided in table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                 
14 An alternative to the outcome model is the substitute model: in countries with weak legal protection for minority 
shareholders, companies use dividends as a means to establish a reputation. The substitute model predicts higher 
dividends for countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). 
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3.3 Data  
 I collect consolidated bank accounts data for 746 banks (Bank Holding Companies 
(BHC), commercial banks, cooperative banks, or savings banks) located either in the U.S. or in 
the European Union (27 countries) from the Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database. The sample 
period is 2000 to 2008. Table 2 summarises the construction of the sample.   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 reports the sample composition. The majority of the institutions in the sample are 
BHC (52%), followed by commercial banks (38%). Most of the banks are located in the U.S. 
(59%). The majority of the U.S. sub-sample consists of BHC (81%, for the EU only 10%), 
while the majority of the EU sub-sample comprises commercial banks (65%, only 18% for the 
U.S.). There are only 3 mutual banks for the U.S. (0.1%) and 77 for the EU (25%). Most of the 
sample consists of banks that were listed in at least one of the years comprising the sample 
period (53%). Around 77% of the observations (2282 out of 2967) pertain to U.S. institutions, 
and around 59% of them pertain to listed institutions.  
Table 3 also reports descriptive statistics for the continuous explanatory variables. All the 
statistics in table 3 are reported after winsorization at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. EU banks are 
riskier (in terms of lnZ, capital ratio, and ROA volatility) than U.S. banks. Annual growth in 
loans is significantly larger for EU banks (almost twice as big as for U.S. banks). U.S. banks are 
more profitable and hold a higher percentage of retained earnings to total equity capital. 
However, U.S. banks are on average smaller than those in the EU sub-sample. The average DPE 
does not significantly differ between the two sub-samples. Overall, it appears than during 2000-
2008 EU banks were (according to accounting-based measures) riskier than U.S. banks, and 
were increasing their lending supply. However, this does not necessarily mean that the actual 
riskiness of the investment portfolios of EU banks was higher than for U.S. banks. In particular, 
our data do not consider differences in off-balance sheet items (especially those related to 
securitisation), which have played an important role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
Listed banks pay less dividends (as a percentage of equity) than unlisted banks. This 
result supports the hypothesis that quotation on a stock exchange may substitute dividends as a 
monitoring device. Listed banks exhibit lower default risk (proxied by lnZ), although they tend 
to bear less capital as a percentage of total assets. The reason for the higher default risk for 
unlisted banks may be a higher ROA volatility. Listed banks are on average smaller than 
unlisted banks. The reason for this unexpected result may be the positive correlation between 
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the country of origin of the bank and the decision to go public. Around 82% of the listed banks 
in my sample are from the U.S. This may suggest that U.S. banks are more inclined to go public 
than EU banks. Banks in the U.S. sub-sample are on average smaller than those in the EU sub-
sample, and this may cause the negative correlation between quotation and size.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations for the dependent and the continuous 
explanatory variables. Like for table 3, all the statistics reported in table 4 are reported after 
winsorization at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Consistent with a risk-shifting hypothesis, DPE is 
negatively correlated with lnZ and the capital ratio, and positively correlated with ROA 
volatility. Consistent with previous studies on the dividend policy of nonfinancial firms, DPE is 
negatively correlated to growth, and positively correlated to retained earnings to equity, 
profitability and size (Denis and Osobov, 2008; DeAngelo et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2001). 
The relationships among the explanatory variables are also consistent with expectations. LnZ is 
positively correlated to the capital ratio and negatively related to ROA volatility. The capital 
ratio and ROA volatility are positively correlated, which may be a consequence of capital 
adequacy regulation (banks with low asset quality are expected to hold more capital).  Small 
banks are more profitable than large banks and tend to hold more capital, consistent with Ayuso 
et al. (2004), Alfon et al. (2004), and Flannery and Rangan (2004). A negative relationship 
between size and the capital ratio has been ascribed to the benefits of diversification (which 
large banks can exploit better than small banks), and to the fact that large banks can raise new 
equity capital in the stock market more easily than small banks. Moreover, lower capital buffers 
for large banks may indicate that they enjoy implicit government guarantees. Not only do small 
banks hold more capital as a percentage of total assets, they also exhibit lower ROA volatility, 
and as a result their Z-scores are also larger on average. Finally, profitability, the capital ratio, 
and retained earnings to equity are positive related. This result supports the pecking-order 
theory of finance, which posits that more profitable banks can improve their capital ratio by 
retaining more earnings (Nier and Baumann, 2006).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4. Results 
This section presents regression results of my econometric models. For consistency 
with the results of the univariate analysis reported in tables 3 and 4, the econometric analysis is 
carried out after winsorization at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile of all variables.  
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Table 5 reports estimation results for the OLS, FEM and GMM-SYS models when lnZ 
is considered as proxy for risk. Each model is run according to three different specifications. For 
all specifications, lnZ is negatively related to DPE. For the OLS specifications, the coefficients 
are insignificant. For FEM, the coefficients on the first lag of the dependent variable are 
negative. This result may be due to the downward bias of the FEM estimator when the 
dependent variable is autocorrelated (Khan, 2006; Nickell, 1981). In the GMM-SYS 
specifications, I allow for endogeneity with respect to default risk: dividend policy and default 
risk may both be a consequence of unobserved factors relating to managerial decisions. The 
diagnostic statistics for GMM-SYS are consistent with the assumptions of this econometric 
model. In particular, the Sargan test does not reject the hypothesis of validity of the instruments.  
For all three cases pertaining to GMM-SYS, the coefficients on lnZ (and on the first lag of lnZ) 
are negative and significant. These results support the risk-shifting hypothesis, while are 
contrary to the charter value hypothesis.  
With regard to the control variables, the results for loans growth and RETE are 
consistent with the findings reported in the literature about nonfinancial firms. The results for 
size change according to the specification employed, and they are insignificant for all three 
GMM-SYS specifications. The results for IPO are significant only in 2 cases (GMM-SYS), and 
they are contrary to those found for the nonfinancial literature. In this case, it may be interesting 
to investigate whether these results differ because of the econometric model employed (GMM-
SYS). The results for listing are consistent with the results for the univariate analysis: a negative 
coefficient supports the hypothesis that quotation on a stock exchange may substitute dividends 
as a monitoring device. The coefficients for IND3 change sign according to whether OLS or 
GMM-SYS is employed. The sign of the coefficient for GMM-SYS is consistent with 
expectations. The change in the direction of the relationship for certain explanatory variables 
justifies the use of a dynamic panel data model. In other words, using the correct specification is 
essential, and the contribution is not merely methodological. The results for the number of 
recorded shareholders, and the dummies IND1 and U.S. (apart from one case) are insignificant. 
Table 6 reports estimation results for the OLS, FEM and GMM-SYS models when the 
capital ratio and ROA volatility are considered as proxy for risk. Each model is run according to 
three different specifications. I allow for endogeneity with respect to the capital ratio and ROA 
volatility (SDROA). The rationale is that managers make decisions about the level of risk taking 
and dividends simultaneously. The diagnostic statistics for GMM-SYS are consistent with the 
assumptions of this econometric model. In particular, the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are valid is not rejected by the Sargan test. For all specifications, the coefficients on the capital 
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ratio are negative and significant, supporting the risk-shifting hypothesis and rejecting the 
opportunity cost hypothesis.
15
 The coefficients on SDROA are positive and significant for the 
OLS and FEM specifications, while for the GMM-SYS specifications they are insignificant at 
conventional levels. However, the lag of SDROA is positive and significant for all three GMM-
SYS specifications, suggesting that risk positively influences future dividends. This is consistent 
with the risk-shifting hypothesis.  
With regard to the control variables, the coefficients for ROA are positive and 
significant for all specifications, consistent with expectations. The results for the other control 
variables are similar to those reported in table 5, apart from RETE, for which the coefficients 
are either insignificant (for the OLS and GMM-SYS regressions) or negative. For the preferred 
specifications (GMM-SYS), the results are very similar to those reported in table 5: the 
coefficients are all negative and significant for loans growth, insignificant (in 2 cases out of 3) 
for size, negative and significant for IPO, and listing. For size, the results may be insignificant 
due to sample selection bias: variables such as RETE may be available only for large banks.  
Overall, my results support the risk-shifting hypothesis, while they do not support either 
the charter value or the opportunity costs hypotheses. 
   [Insert tables 5 and 6 here]   
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
In this paper, I have investigated the interplay between dividends and bank risk. 
Dividends may constitute a risk-shifting device for banks that are close to default, because they 
transfer risk to the debt holders and, via the deposit insurance scheme, to the taxpayer. Capital 
requirements should help reduce moral hazard deriving from the deposit insurance scheme and 
other types of government guarantees. However, capital adequacy regulation may backfire 
because it could lead to lower franchise values and higher incentives to gamble for bank owners. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of capital adequacy regulation can be impaired by practices of 
capital management and the use of hybrid instruments.  
I find a positive relationship between default risk and dividends, consistent with my 
hypothesis that dividends may be used as a risk-shifting device for banks with high default risk. 
However, I also find evidence that capital regulation may not be able to reduce this type of 
moral hazard behaviour: banks with lower capital ratios tend distribute more dividends. These 
                                                 
15
 These results obtain even when the regulatory total capital ratio (regulatory capital to total risk-
weighted assets) is employed in place of equity to total assets. 
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results are not consistent with the view that capital adequacy is enough to reduce potential moral 
hazard behaviour by imposing opportunity costs on dividends for banks. Moreover, I provide 
some evidence of a positive relationship between returns volatility and dividends. These results 
suggest that capital adequacy regulation (in particular, the framework commonly referred to as 
Basel I) may not fully capture bank risk, or that the influence of this type of regulation on 
dividends is not as strong as it would be advisable.   
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. The current debate on 
whether dividends should be curbed in banks that are not financially sound or with liquidity 
problems can draw further insights from my analysis. My results support recent proposals 
(Basel III) regarding the need to constrain dividends when capital ratios are close to the 
regulatory minimum. Restrictions of dividends payments may also be coordinated with 
complementary measures including, for instance, issuance of new common equity capital. 
 
 
References 
Acharya V. V., Gujral I., Shin H. S. (2009). Dividends and bank capital in the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. Working paper. 
Ahmed A. S., Takeda C., Thomas S. (1999). Bank loan loss provisions: a reexamination of 
capital management, earnings management and signaling effects. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 28, 1-25.  
Ai C., Norton E. C. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters, 80, 
123-129. 
Alfon I., Argimon I., Bascunana-Ambros P. (2004). What determines how much capital is held 
by UK banks and building societies? Occasional paper No 22. UK Financial Services Authority.   
Allen L., Gottesman A., Saunders A., Tang Y. (2009). The role of banks in dividend policy. 
New York University, Stern School of Business Working Paper. 
Altunbas Y., Carbo S., Gardener E. P. M., Molyneux P. (2007). Examining the relationships 
between capital, risk and efficiency in European banking. European Financial Management, 13 
(1), 49-70. 
Altunbas Y., Gambacorta L., Marques-Ibanez D. (2009). Bank risk and monetary policy. 
European Central Bank, working paper #1075.  
Andres C., Betzer A., Goergen M., Renneboog L. (2009). Dividend policy of German firms. A 
panel data analysis of partial adjustment models. Journal of Empirical Finance, 16, 175-187. 
Arellano M., Bond S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence 
and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 58, 277-297. 
Arellano M., Bover O.  (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29-51. 
Ayuso J., Perez D., Saurina J. (2004). Are capital buffers procyclical? Evidence from Spanish 
panel data. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 249-264. 
 19 
Bar-Yosef S., Huffman L. (1986). The informational content of dividends: A 19 ignaling 
approach. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21, 47-58. 
Beatty A., Liao S. (2009). Regulatory capital ratios, loan loss provisioning, and pro-cyclicality. 
Working paper. 
Berger A. N. (1995). The relationship between capital and earnings in banking. Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, 27 (2), 432-456. 
Bessler W., Nohel T. (1996). The stock-market reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by 
commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20 (9), 1485-1508. 
Bessler W., Nohel T. (2000). Asymmetric information, dividend reductions and contagion 
effects in bank stock returns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24 (9), 1831-1848. 
Black F., Scholes M. (1972). The valuation of option contracts and a test of market efficiency. 
The Journal of Finance, 27 (2), 399-417. 
Blundell R., Bond S. (1998).  Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models.  Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143. 
Boldin R., Leggett K. (1995). Bank dividend policy as a signal of bank quality. Financial 
Services Review, 4 (1), 1-8. 
Borio C., Furfine C., Lowe P. (2001). Procyclicality of the financial system and financial 
stability: issues and policy options. BIS Papers n.1, March. 
Boyd J. H., Graham S. L. (1988). The profitability and risk effects of allowing bank holding 
companies to merge with other financial firms: a simulation study. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 12, 3–20. 
Brunnermeier M., Crocket A., Goodhart C., Persaud A. D., Shin H. S. (2009). The fundamental 
principles of financial regulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11. 
Caruana J. (2010). Basel III: towards a safer financial system. Speech at the 3rd Santander 
International Banking Conference, 15 September 2010. 
Casey K.M., Dickens R.N. (2000). The effect of tax and regulatory changes on commercial 
bank dividend policy. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 40, 279–293. 
Casey K.M., Dickens R.N., Newman J.A. (2002). Bank dividend policy: explanatory factors. 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, December. 
Chan Y.-S., Greenbaum S. I., Thakor A. V. (1992). Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible? 
Journal of Finance, 47(1), 227-45. 
Collins J., Shackelford D, Wahlen J. (1995). Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory 
capital, earnings and taxes. Journal of Accounting Research, 33 (2), 263-292. 
Cornett M. M., Fayman A., Marcus A. J., Tehranian H. (2008). Dividend signalling: evidence 
from bank IPOs. Unpublished paper.  
DeAngelo H., DeAngelo L., Skinner D. J. (2004). Are dividends disappearing? Dividend 
concentration and the consolidation of earnings. Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 425-456. 
DeAngelo H., DeAngelo L., Stulz R. M. (2006). Dividend policy and the earned/contributed 
capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 227-254.  
De Nicoló G. (2000). Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective. Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers # 689.  
Denis D. J., Osobov I. (2008). Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the 
determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 62-82. 
 20 
Easterbrook F. (1984). Two agency cost explanations of dividends. The American Economic 
Review, 72, 650–58. 
European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, ESFRC (2006). Basel II and the scope for 
Prompt Corrective Actions in Europe. Statement No 25. 
Fama E. F., Babiak H. (1968). Dividend policy: an empirical analysis. American Statistical 
Association Journal, 63, 1132-1161. 
Fama E. F., French K. R. (1992). The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of 
Finance, 47, 427-465.  
Fama E. F., French K. R. (2001). Disappearing dividends: changing firms characteristics or 
lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 3-43. 
Faccio M., Lang L. H. P., Young L. (2001). Dividends and expropriation. The American 
Economic Review, 91 (1), 54-78. 
Filbeck G., Mullineaux D.J. (1999). Agency costs and dividend payments – the case of bank 
holding companies. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 39, 409-418. 
Financial Stability Board. Press Release, 15 September 2009. 
Flannery M., Rangan K. (2004). What caused the bank capital build-up of the 1990s? Working 
paper No 2004-03-03. FDIC Center for Financial Research.   
Garven J. R. (2009). Derivation and comparative statics of the Black-Scholes call and put option 
pricing formulas. Working paper. 
Gianmarino R. M., Lewis T. R., Sappington D. E. M. (1993). An Incentive Approach to 
Banking Regulation. Journal of Finance, 48(4), 1523- 42. 
Gropp R., Gründl C., Güttler A. (2010). The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk Taking: 
Evidence From a Natural Experiment. Working paper. 
Gropp R., Heider F. (2010). The determinants of bank capital structure. Review of Finance, 
forthcoming. 
Gropp R., Vesala J., Vulpes G. (2004). Market indicators, bank fragility, and indirect market 
discipline. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, September, 53-62. 
Grossman S. J., Hart O. D. (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the 
corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64. 
Hellmann T. F., Murdock K. C., Stiglitz J. E. (2000). Liberalization, moral hazard in banking, 
and prudential regulation: Are capital requirements enough? The American Economic Review, 
90 (1), 147-165.  
Hoberg G, Prabhala N. R. (2009). Disappearing dividends, catering, and risk. Review of 
Financial Studies, 22, 79-116. 
Jensen M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. The 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-339. 
Khan T. (2006). Company dividends and ownership structure: evidence from UK panel data. 
The Economic Journal, 116, C172-C189.  
Keeley M. C. (1990). Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. The American 
Economic Review, 80 (5), 1183-1200. 
Laeven L., Levine R. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 93 (2), 259-275. 
 21 
Laeven L., Majnoni G. (2003). Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much, too 
late? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 178-197. 
La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (2000). Agency problems and 
dividend policies around the world. The Journal of Finance, 55 (1), 1-33. 
Li K., Zhao X. (2008). Asymmetric information and dividend policy. Financial Management, 
Winter, 673-694. 
Lintner J. (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earning 
and taxes. The American Economic Review, 46 (2), 97-113. 
Merton R. C. (1973). Theory of rational option pricing. Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 4, 141-183. 
Merton R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. 
Journal of Finance, 29, 449-470. 
Merton R. C. (1977). An analytical derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan 
guarantees. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1(2), 3-11. 
Nickell S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica, 49, 1417–1426. 
Nier E., Baumann U. (2006). Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 15, 332-361. 
Noronha G. M., Shome D.K., Morgan G.E. (1996). The monitoring rationale for dividends and 
the interaction of capital structure and dividend decisions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 
439-454. 
Petrovic A., Tutsch R. (2009). National rescue measures in response to the current financial 
crisis. European Central Bank, working paper #8. 
Ronn E. I., Verma A. K. (1986). Pricing risk-adjusted deposit insurance: an option based model. 
The Journal of Finance, 41 (4), 871-895. 
Rozeff M.S. (1982). Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout 
Ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5, 249-259. 
Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 94 (3), 461-488. 
Von Eije H., Megginson W. (2006). Dividend policy in the European Union. Unpublished paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Appendix  
 
Analytical explanation of the relationship between the value of common equity, 
dividends, and risk 
In this appendix I give a brief account of the models by Merton (1974, 1977) on the 
pricing of corporate debt and of the cost of deposit insurance, and how they relate to dividend 
payments and risk. For details regarding the models, I refer the reader to Merton (1974, 1977), 
and Ronn and Verma (1986).  
The model on the pricing of corporate debt developed by Merton (1974) is based on the 
isomorphic relation between common equity of a levered firm and a common stock call option. 
The model on the pricing of deposit insurance developed by Merton (1977) relies upon the 
isomorphic relation between loan guarantees and common stock put options, and can be applied 
to any guarantee of a third party on behalf of the borrower, such as guarantees of a parent 
company for a loan made by a third party to one of its subsidiaries.  
Assume that the value of assets of a bank at time t (At) follows a Geometric Brownian 
motion: 
dln(At) = μdt + σdWt        (A1) 
where μ is the instantaneous expected return on assets, σ is the instantaneous standard 
deviation of returns, and Wt is a Wiener process. The payoff of a European call option with 
strike price X on the expiration date, t
*
, is the greater between 0 and the difference between At* 
and X, or MAX[0, At* – X], while the payoff of a European put option is MAX[0, X – At*]. In a 
frictionless market, the ‘no arbitrage opportunities’ condition (Black and Scholes, 1972) holds:16 
                                                 
16
 The ‘no arbitrage opportunities condition’ states that ‘[…] in equilibrium a riskless hedge cannot yield 
a return greater than the short term interest rate in the market, the option must be priced such that market 
participants could not establish this hedge and expect to realize a sure profit.’ (Black and Scholes, 1972, 
p.400).  
 23 
Ct = AtN(d1) – Xe
-rT
N(d2)         
d1 = [ln(At/X)+ (r + 0.5σ
2
) T]/ σT0.5   
d2 = d1 – σT
0.5
          (A2) 
Pt = Ct + Xe
-rT
 – At        (A3) 
Where Ct is the price of the call option (for one share), Pt is the price of the put option 
(for the same share), r is the short-term rate of interest, T is the duration of the option (time to 
expiration), and N(.) is the value of the cumulative distribution function of the standard Normal 
distribution. According to Merton (1977), the face value of debt of a corporation, D, can be seen 
as the strike price of a call, or X in equation (A2). In such circumstances, the equity value of the 
bank, Et, can be calculated using: 
Et = AtN(d1) – De
-rT
N(d2)        (A4) 
where D is the face value of debt. 
The cost of deposit insurance, Gt, can be modelled according to (A3), but with an 
adjustment to consider the fraction of the bank liabilities that consists of insured deposits, η = 
D1/D. If all pre-insurance debt is of equal seniority, depositors (in the absence of deposit 
insurance) will receive the lower between the future value of deposits, FV(D1), and the pro-rated 
fraction of the value of the total assets of the bank, Atη. The payoff generated by the deposit 
insurance at maturity is MAX[0, FV(D1) – Atη] (Ronn and Verma, 1986). The deposit insurance 
premium can be modelled as follows: 
Gt = N(h2) – (1 – δ)(At/De
-rT
)N(h1)       
h1 = {ln[D/At(1 – δ)] – T(r + 0.5σ
2
)} /σT0.5      
h2 = h1 + σT
0.5
          (A5) 
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where Gt is the premium of the deposit insurance per each dollar of insured deposits, 
equivalent to the value of a put with a strike price equal to total debt (D) divided by D1, δ is the 
dividend per dollar of At, assuming that dividends are paid once for each period. Equation (A5) 
shows that, ceteris paribus, a larger δ increases Gt because it decreases At. Note that in equation 
(A4) dividends do not decrease the value of equity because equity is dividend-protected (Ronn 
and Verma, 1986). If deposit insurance exists in the banking system, banks that pay dividends 
can increase the value of deposit insurance by paying dividends. Banks are also incentivised to 
increase the debt-to-assets ratio, because this decreases At/De
-rT
. 
The value of a debt in a leveraged bank which pays dividends is: 
Ft = De
-rT
 [N(f2) + (1 – δ)(At/De
-rT
)N(f1)]       
f1 = – {0.5σ
2
T – ln[De-rT/ At(1 – δ)]} /σT
0.5
 
f2 = – {0.5σ
2
T + ln[De
-rT
/At(1 – δ)]} /σT
0.5
       (A6) 
Therefore, dividends reduce the value of bank assets and the overall amount that debt 
holders can claim in the event of liquidation. Dividends reduce the value of debt because debt, 
unlike equity, is not dividend-protected. Given the face value of uninsured debt, D2 = D – D1, 
dividends decrease the probability that uninsured debt holders will be repaid if the bank 
collapses. Assume that, in the event of a default, all insured depositors are paid by the deposit 
insurance scheme,
17
 so that uninsured debt holder can claim the total of the assets of the bank, 
At. Then, the future value of uninsured debt for banks that do not pay dividends is:  
FV(D2)  = min[At, D2]        (A7)  
For banks that pay dividends, the future value of uninsured debt is:  
                                                 
17
 In such conditions, the option component of equity disappears, and the market value of insured debt 
becomes the no-default risk value (Gropp et al., 2004).  
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FV(D2)*  = min[(1 – δ)At, D2]        (A8) 
Note that for any δ > 0, if (1 – δ)At < D2, then FV(D2)* < FV(D2). Paying dividends 
benefits common shareholders because they receive cash while debt holders do not, and 
dividends reduce the probability that uninsured debt holders will be paid in full. This effect is 
stronger for banks for which D2 is large. As D2 increase (for instance, because of the issuance of 
hybrid instruments, as in Acharya et al, 2009), De
-rT
N(d2) in equation (A4) approaches AtN(d1), 
and Et → 0. Therefore, banks may increase the debt-to-assets ratio to increase Gt (to the extent 
that this is allowed by capital adequacy regulation), but in so doing the value of equity would 
decrease, as it would be for a call option with a larger strike price.  
Banks with Et → 0 may attempt to increase Et by increasing business risk, which in the 
BS-model can be represented by σ (Merton, 1973). More risk increases the payoff of a call 
option conditional on the option being exercised. This can be easily shown taking the first 
derivative of (A4) with respect to σ (also called Vega):18 
∂Et/∂σ = Atn(d1)T
0.5
         (A9) 
Where n(.) is the probability density function of the standard Normal distribution. Given 
that At ≥ 0, n(d1) ≥ 0, and T
0.5 ≥ 0, it follows that an increase in business risk brings about a 
higher value of Et. What is the impact of business risk on the current value of debt, Ft? As 
shown in Merton (1974), Ft = At – Et. Therefore, there is a negative relation between Ft and Et. 
Due to the positive relation between σ and Et (equation A9), it follows that Ft is negatively 
related to σ, i.e. an increase in business risk decreases the current value of the debt (see also 
Merton, 1974, p. 455). Therefore, as said in the introduction, ceteris paribus dividends and the 
issuance of debt decrease the capital ratio and incentivise risk taking. 
                                                 
18
 For a derivation of (A9), please refer to Garven (2009), pp. 13-14.  
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Table 1 Explanatory variables definitions. 
Capital ratio 
(CR) 
total equity to total assets of bank i in year t. 
Profitability 
(ROA net of 
loan loss 
provisions) 
net income of bank i in year t plus loan loss provision of bank i in year t dividend by total assets 
of bank i in year t. I prefer ROA to ROE (Return On Equity) because ROE does not take into 
account the effect of leverage on profitability and risk. 
SDROA 
(ROA 
volatility) 
Standard deviation of ROA (net income on average total assets) for bank i in tear t, calculated 
using a 3-year moving average for t-1, t, and t+1:  
( )∑
1+t
-1=t
2
iitit ROA-ROA1-T
1
=SDROA  where ∑
2-T
-1=t
iti
ROA
T
1
=ROA  and T = 3. 
lnZ natural logarithm of the Z-score, calculated as the ROA of bank i in year t plus the equity to 
total assets of bank i in year t divided by ROA volatility: 
lnzit = ln(Zit)= ]SDROA)TAE+[(ROA itititit //ln  where Eit is total equity and TAit is total 
assets of bank i in year t. 
Earned 
equity 
(RETE) 
retained earnings of bank i in year t dividend by the total equity of bank i in year t 
Recorded 
shareholders 
number of recorded shareholders in 2009
+
. 
Listed bank 1 if bank i is listed on the stock market in year t and 0 otherwise.
 
IND1  1 if there is no shareholder with more than 25% of total ownership in 2009
+
 and 0 otherwise.  
IND2  1 if there is a shareholder with more than 25% if total ownership but no shareholder with more 
than 50% of total ownership in 2009
+
 and 0 otherwise.  
IND3  1 if there is a shareholder with more than 50% of total ownership in 2009
+
 and 0 otherwise.  
Loans 
growth 
average annual % rate of growth in loans of bank i between years t-1 and t. 
Size  log of assets of bank i in year t. 
Initial 
Public 
Offerings 
1 if bank i went public during 2000-2008, and 0 otherwise 
+ Bankscope provides data for these variables only as of the last accounting year available. However, because these data tend to be 
sticky, it is unlikely that this has affected my results.  
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Table 2 Construction of the sample. 
 Search criterion Number 
of banks 
Step 1 Geographic: U.S. and European Union (27)                                                                             25,104 
Step 2 Specialisation: Bank Holding Companies (BHC), commercial banks,                                
cooperative banks, savings banks 
22,585 
Step 3 Consolidated accounts: C1 and C2 in BankScope                                                                    3,974 
Step 4  Information availability: listing on a stock exchange (listed, unlisted, or   
delisted)  
3,968 
 
Step 5 Information availability: dividends for year t and for year t-1 1,193 
Step 6 Information availability: other explanatory variables       746 
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Table 3  Sample composition and main descriptive statistics.  
    U.S. EU Listed Unlisted  ALL 
Sample 
composition 
All Banks 440 306 398+ 355 746 
BHC 357 29 289+ 100 386 
Commercial 80 200 89+ 195 280 
Cooperative 1 44 16 29 45 
Savings 2 33 4 31 35 
DPE 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 0.0446 0.0485 0.0429b 0.0492b 0.0455 
SD 0.0440 0.0490 0.0300 0.0603 0.0452 
p50 0.0363 0.0328 0.0399 0.0257 0.0359 
p1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p99 0.2222 0.2425 0.1523 0.2425 0.2425 
lnZ 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 4.2997a 3.7791a 4.2767b 4.0422b 4.1795 
SD 0.9370 1.0210 0.9390 1.0238 0.9817 
p50 4.3074 3.7776 4.2808 4.1114 4.2029 
p1 1.6748 1.6748 1.8810 1.5292 1.6748 
p99 6.5961 6.6341 6.5867 6.6265 6.5961 
Capital Ratio 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 0.0972a 0.0754a 0.0909 b 0.0939 b 0.0921 
SD 0.0362 0.0421 0.0359 0.0423 0.0387 
p50 0.0912 0.0682 0.0887 0.0864 0.0878 
p1 0.0543 0.0264 0.0270 0.0264 0.0264 
p99 0.2259 0.2259 0.1787 0.2259 0.2259 
SDROA  
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 0.0027 a 0.0041 a 0.0024 b 0.0040 b 0.0030 
SD 0.0073 0.0161 0.0055 0.0141 0.0100 
p50 0.0014 0.0017 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 
p1 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
p99 0.0222 0.0362 0.0174 0.0277 0.0234 
Loans Growth 
 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 0.1157 a 0.2049 a 0.1337 0.1399 0.1363 
SD 0.1722 0.2321 0.1569 0.2315 0.1914 
p50 0.0950 0.2215 0.1085 0.1171 0.1116 
p1 -0.3222 -0.3222 -0.2316 -0.3222 -0.3222 
p99 0.6897 0.6897 0.6654 0.6897 0.6897 
Earned equity 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 0.5090 a 0.3948 a 0.4900 0.4722 0.4826 
SD 0.3158 0.2886 0.2968 0.3353 0.3134 
p50 0.5173 0.3772 0.5007 0.4707 0.4839 
p1 -0.1890 -0.0377 -0.0377 -0.4238 -0.1681 
p99 1.1391 0.9508 1.1391 1.0377 1.1329 
ROA (net of 
loan loss 
provisions) 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 0.0135 a 0.0119 a 0.0129 0.0134 0.0131 
SD 0.0076 0.0083 0.0069 0.0088 0.0078 
p50 0.0125 0.0105 0.0122 0.0121 0.0122 
p1 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012 0.0000 0.0011 
p99 0.0497 0.0465 0.0360 0.0497 0.0497 
Size (log of 
assets) 
Obs 2282 685 1737 1230 2967 
Mean 14.6065 a 16.3658 a 14.9005 b 15.1710 b 15.0126 
SD 1.5618 2.2048 1.8169 1.9630 1.8833 
p50 14.3873 16.2098 14.4746 14.9261 14.6206 
p1 12.1196 11.9736 12.5183 11.9736 11.9736 
p99 20.1284 20.8170 20.8170 20.4640 20.7426 
Notes: All the statistics are shown for banks for which the payout ratio (dividends/equity), and the other explanatory variables 
(including the first lag of the payout ratio) are available. All the statistics are calculated after winsorization at the 1st and 99th 
percentile for all variables.  
+ Seven banks went public or were delisted during the sample period (3 BHC and 4 commercial banks). For this reason, they appear 
as both listed and unlisted, causing the sum of the banks in the columns ‘Listed’ and ‘Unlisted’ to be 753, instead of 746. 
a,b Denotes the two means are significantly different at the 5% level, according to a two-sample t-test with unequal variances.  
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Table 4 Pairwise correlations (continuous variables). 
 
DPE lnz Capital Ratio ROA volatility Loans Growth Earned equity Profitability 
lnz -0.0499*** 
      
Capital Ratio -0.0742*** 0.0683*** 
     
SDROA 0.0857*** -0.3807*** 0.1574*** 
    
Loans Growth -0.0977*** 0.0091** -0.0704*** -0.0432** 
   
Earned equity 0.1003*** 0.1425*** 0.0063** -0.0535*** -0.1388*** 
  
Profitability 0.3058*** -0.0644*** 0.4663*** 0.1329*** -0.0407** 0.2208***  
Size 0.1135*** -0.1548*** -0.2532*** 0.0177** 0.0894*** -0.0707*** -0.0253** 
Notes: All the statistics are shown for banks for which the payout ratio (dividends/equity), and the other explanatory variables (including the first lag of the payout ratio) are available. All the statistics are 
calculated after winsorization at the 1st and 99th percentile for all variables. The correlations are calculated using 2969 observations.  
* Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
**  Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
*** Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for DPE (lnZ as a proxy for risk). 
 Dependent variable: Dividends/equity, DPE  
  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 FEM1 FEM2 FEM3 GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 
DPE(t-1) 0.0058*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** 0.1698*** 0.1598*** 0.1779*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
lnZ -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0019** -0.0015** -0.0017** -0.0015** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
lnZ(t-1)       
-0.0061*** -0.0082*** -0.0079*** 
       
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Loans  -0.0318*** -0.0318*** -0.0329*** -0.0114*** -0.0112*** -0.0112*** -0.0109** -0.0127*** -0.0123** 
Growth (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0050) 
RETE 0.0116*** 0.0117*** 0.0139*** 0.0157*** 0.0156** 0.0156** 0.0189** 0.0178** 0.0197** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0081) 
Size  0.0027*** 0.0028*** 0.0022*** -0.0100*** -0.0099*** -0.0099*** -0.0033 0.0009 -0.0026 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0037) 
IPO -0.0237 -0.0263 -0.0235 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0221* -0.0251** -0.0273** 
 
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0133) 
Listing -0.0050***   
-0.0190** 
  
-0.0210** 
 
 
 
(0.0017) 
  
(0.0090) 
  
(0.0106) 
 
 
Recorded 
sh.ders  
-0.0000 
     
0.0007  
  
(0.0000) 
     
(0.0004)  
IND1   
0.0019 
     
-0.0258 
   
(0.0020) 
     
(0.0175) 
IND3   
0.0112*** 
     
-0.0804** 
   
(0.0022) 
     
(0.0324) 
U.S. -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0016    
-0.0420 -0.0489** -0.0445 
 
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
   
(0.0280) (0.0229) (0.0343) 
Year effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2,967 2,967 2,967 2,967 2,967 2,967 2,313 2,313 2,313 
Banks 746 746 746 746 746 746 670 670 670 
m1       
-4.326*** -4.362*** -4.380*** 
m2       
-0.0770 -0.184 -0.114 
Sargan       
57.80 54.79 50.41 
Sargan df       
47 46 45 
Notes:  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. OLS1-OLS3 are Ordinary Least Square regressions. FEM1-FEM3 are fixed-effects panel-data 
regressions. GMM1-GMM3, are systems of first-differenced and levels equations. DPE(t-1), and lnZ(t-1), denote the first lag of DPE, and lnZ, 
respectively. For the GMM specifications, the instruments used are: For DPE: Differenced equations: DPE(t-2),…,DPE(1). Levels equations: 
ΔDPE(t-1). For lnZ: Differenced equations: lnZ(t-3),…,lnZ(1). Levels equations: ΔlnZ(t-2). m1 and m2 are tests for absence of 1st and 2nd order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. Under the null hypothesis m1 and m2 are asymptotically distributed as standard 
Normal variables with mean 0 and variance 1. m1 significantly different from zero is consistent with assumption of no serial correlation across 
disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are valid). m2 significantly different from zero is not consistent with assumption of no 
serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are invalid). Sargan refers to the test statistic for over-identifying 
restrictions, distributed asymptotically as a χ2(df). * Denotes significance at the 10% level. ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. *** Denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: Estimation results for DPE (equity/total assets and ROA volatility as a proxies for risk). 
 Dependent variable: Dividends/equity, DPE  
  OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 FEM1 FEM2 FEM3 GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 
DPE(t-1) 0.0018 0.0020 0.0020 -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0060*** 0.1306*** 0.1171*** 0.1411*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0169) (0.0172) (0.0166) 
CR  -0.2978*** -0.2919*** -0.3036*** -0.4223*** -0.4267*** -0.4267*** -0.4467*** -0.4974*** -0.4205*** 
 
(0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0870) (0.0893) (0.0856) 
CR(t-1)       
0.0926* 0.1765*** 0.1893*** 
       
(0.0497) (0.0482) (0.0478) 
SDROA   0.2294*** 0.2408*** 0.2445*** 0.2733*** 0.2759*** 0.2759*** -0.0167 0.0116 -0.0619* 
 
(0.0756) (0.0756) (0.0753) (0.0856) (0.0856) (0.0856) (0.0376) (0.0386) (0.0321) 
SDROA       
0.6891*** 0.8431*** 0.6042*** 
(t-1)       
(0.1499) (0.1694) (0.1549) 
ROA 2.4404*** 2.4438*** 2.4202*** 1.7288*** 1.7323*** 1.7323*** 1.2061*** 1.2772*** 1.1940*** 
 
(0.1141) (0.1144) (0.1139) (0.1479) (0.1479) (0.1479) (0.2000) (0.2017) (0.2231) 
Loans  -0.0324*** -0.0324*** -0.0334*** -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0090** -0.0097** -0.0122*** 
Growth (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0045) 
RETE -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0001 -0.0219*** -0.0222*** -0.0222*** -0.0204 -0.0208 -0.0123 
 
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0145) 
Size  0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0008* -0.0158*** -0.0158*** -0.0158*** -0.0058** -0.0009 -0.0061* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0034) 
IPO -0.0211 -0.0238 -0.0212 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0269** -0.0272** -0.0276** 
 
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0139) 
Listing -0.0052***   
-0.0106 
  
-0.0176** 
 
 
 
(0.0015) 
  
(0.0087) 
  
(0.0087) 
 
 
Recorded   
-0.0000 
     
0.0004  
Sh.ders  
(0.0000) 
     
(0.0003)  
IND1   
0.0020 
     
-0.0158 
   
(0.0018) 
     
(0.0124) 
IND3   
0.0108*** 
     
-0.0054 
   
(0.0020) 
     
(0.0348) 
U.S. 0.0007 -0.0000 0.0009    
-0.0386* -0.0546*** -0.0256 
 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
   
(0.0221) (0.0196) (0.0325) 
Year  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2,969 2,969 2,969 2,969 2,969 2,969 2,313 2,313 2,313 
Banks 746 746 746 746 746 746 670 670 670 
m1       
-4.341*** -4.405*** -4.386*** 
m2       
0.145 0.196 0.238 
Sargan       62.15 61.21 57.72 
Sargan df       
50 49 48 
Notes:  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. OLS1-OLS3 are Ordinary Least Square regressions. FEM1-FEM3 are fixed-effects 
panel-data regressions. GMM1-GMM3, are systems of first-differenced and levels equations. DPE(t-1), CR(t-1) and  SDROA(t-1), 
denote the first lag of DPE, Capital Ratio and SDROA (ROA volatility), respectively. For the GMM specifications, the instruments 
used are: For DPE: Differenced equations: DPE(t-2),…,DPE(1). Levels equations: ΔDPE(t-1). For CR: Differenced equations: 
CR(t-3). Levels equations: ΔCR(t-2). For SDROA: Differenced equations: SDROA(t-3). Levels equations: ΔSDROA(t-2). m1 and 
m2 are tests for absence of 1st and 2nd order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. Under the null hypothesis 
m1 and m2 are asymptotically distributed as standard Normal variables with mean 0 and variance 1. m1 significantly different from 
zero is consistent with assumption of no serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions of the GMM-SYS model are valid). 
m2 significantly different from zero is not consistent with assumption of no serial correlation across disturbances (the assumptions 
of the GMM-SYS model are invalid). Sargan refers to the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions, distributed asymptotically as 
a χ2(df). * Denotes significance at the 10% level. ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
